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A FEDERAL JUDGE'S KlEW OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CHANGES IN PATENT LAW

People who do not know much about patent law-and especially
[lawyers]--continue to talk about patents promoting the "Progress
of Science and useful Arts" because those are the words they find
in the [I]ntellectual [P]roperty [C]lause of the [C]onstitution.
Numerous scholars over the years have pointed out the nature and
origin of the clause, its balanced construction, and that what it
means is that copyrights to authors were to be the means for
promoting science, meaning the dissemination of knowledge, while
patents were to be the means of promoting the useful arts. The
writers of the 1952 [A]ct put that learning into both the House and
Senate reports therein. I hope you lawyers will try to preserve that
distinction, and prevent backsliding, carrying the knowledge
forward one more generation.
The Late Judge Giles SutherlandRich'
I. INTRODUCTION: THE BIGGEST CHANGE IN PATENT
LAWS N HALF-A-CENTURY

Congress now faces the most radical and cataclysmic change in its
patent laws in more than a half century in the Patent Reform Act of 2005
(H.R. 2795).2 Its passage would change the landscape of patent law so
dramatically that it could be unrecognizable to most of today's patent
practitioners.
It is vital to America's very existence as an economic power and as the
leader of the free world that Congress makes the right decision in this
matter. According to the late Judge Giles Sutherland Rich, it is the U.S.
Patent System that has made America great.3 He always credited the

1. Giles Sutherland Rich, Judge, U.S. Court for the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals,
Speech to the American Patent Law Association (Oct. 3, 1975) (Judge Rich served on his court, on
a full-time basis, until he died at the age of 94.).
2. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005).
3. This viewpoint was expressed to this author personally by Judge Rich, during a social
visit, in his private judicial chambers, at 717 Madison Place, Washington, D.C. Congress also
agreed with Judge Rich. See 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (1)&(2). Congress declared that
[t]echnology and industrial innovation are central to the economic, environmental,
and social well-being of the citizens of the United States. Technology and
industrial innovation offer an improved standardof living, increased public and
private sector productivity, creation of new industries and employment
opportunities, improved public services and enhanced competitiveness of United
States products in world markets.
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"United States Patent Incentive System" for maintaining America's very
high standard of living, and believed that we would jeopardize that
standard of living if we did not continue to protect our patent system.4
Yogi Berra said, "It's like dejA vu all over again." H.R. 2795,
introduced by Representative Lamar Smith (R-TX), Chairman of the U.S.
House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property,
revives many of the same old contentious issues that were engendered by
Senate Bill 2255-a patent bill introduced back in the mid 1970s during
the 93rd Congress. 5 Back then, many members of the patent bar strongly
believed that Senate Bill 2255 did not accomplish any of the six goals of
the President's Commission on the Patent System. These six goals were:
1. To raise the quality and the reliability of the United States
patent;
2. To shorten ... [the] application [period,] from filing to final
disposition in the Patent Office;
3. To accelerate the public disclosure of technological advances;
4. To reduce the expenses of litigation;
5. To make United States' patent practice more compatible with
that of other major countries and more consistent with the
objectives of the United States' patent system;
6. To prepare our patent system to cope with the exploding
technology foreseeable in the decades ahead.6
I will analyze the major provisions of pending H.R. 2795 with a strong
magnifying glass and meticulous scrutiny to determine whether it would
accomplish the six goals of the President's Commission on the Patent

Id. (emphasis added). The former President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology also
expressed the same concerns as Judge Rich, when he stated, "There is an urgent need for continued
innovation to improve the quality of life and to continue economic development." Jerome Weisner,
Warning: America Can't Turn Back the Technology Clock, INC. MAG., May 1, 1977, at 10.
4. See Asian PatentFilings Rise Sharply, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2006. More than 134,000
patent applications were filed in 2005, and the United States still led the world last year in new
inventions. However, applications from China rose 44%, overtaking Canada, Australia, and Italy.
Additionally, applications from Japan rose 24% overtaking Germany, France, and Britain. This
indicates that Asian countries are catching up rapidly with the West. See also Michael S. Mireles,
Jr., The United States PatentReform Quagmire: A BalancedProposal,6 MINN. J.L. SC1. & TECH.
709, 715 (2005) (asserting that patent law reform is necessary because our present patent system
is stifling innovation.).
5. See Separate Views of Senator Hiram L. Fong to Accompany S. 2255, Patent Law
Revision, 94th Cong. (1975).
6. See S. Doc. No. 90-5, at 11-12 (1967).
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System. In doing so, we will keep in mind the wisdom of the former Chief
Judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 7 Judge Eugene Worley,
who in 1969 said:
Congress, of course, had no way of knowing in 1952 what lay in the
test tube then or what would become a reality tomorrow. But it
devised a statute-a model of legislative craftsmanship and
foresight-broad enough to anticipate and nourish [t]he
technological explosion we have witnessed. Our patent system is a
delicate balance of interests; it protects the fruits of the
extraordinary efforts it demands of inventors compatibly with the
public interest. It has largely fostered the favorable climate
resulting in the tremendous strides this country has made in
reaching the pinnacle in the worldwide competition in the arts and
sciences-from atomic energy to antihistamines, computers to
catalysts, lasers to lunar landings.
So it is with no little surprise and concern that one learns of
proposed patent "reforms." I can appreciate, from my own
Congressional experience, the difficulty of enacting legislation
acceptable to all concerned. However, after having dealt with the
patent statutes, particularly the 1952 Patent Act, for nearly twenty
years as a member of this court, I have grave misgivings concerning
the desirability or need for any substantive change in a system that
has worked so well in following the constitutional mandate "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."8
This Article will cover almost all of the important contentious issues
raised by H.R. 2795, plus my proposed changes, in the following order: (a)
the first-to-file system; (b) the problems inherent in continuation
applications; (c) prior user rights; (d) the injunction controversy; (e)
limitations upon damages in the context of injunctions; (f) the arguments
for nine-month publication; (g) the problems in quantifying damages; (h)
elimination of the "best mode" requirement; (i) continuation of
injunctions; j)post-issuance prior art by third parties; (k) pre-issuance
submissions by third parties; and (1)proposed changes in the law; (m)new

7. The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was one of the two predecessor courts of
the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit, which was created on October 1, 1982, in
Washington, D.C., by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat.
25 (1982).
8. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1406-07 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (Worley, J., concurring).
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opposition proceedings. In addition, this Article will address problems still
remaining in H.R. 2795.
Accordingly, I will point out two serious problems with our present
patent laws that have not been addressed by Congress in H.R. 2795, and
give recommendations to address those problems.
My views on each of the new provisions will be adduced, pro or con,
and then addressed according to whether the provisions in the bill as a
whole meet the six goals of the President's Commission on the Patent
System.9
11. THE MOST IMPORTANT PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE PATENT LAWS IN
HALF-A-CENTURY

A. The First-to-FileChange
Present U.S. patent law gives the patent to the "first person to invent"
(FTI), rather than the "first to file" (FTF).'0 The change to a FTF system
in H.R. 2795" eliminates many hurdles and solves many problems
germane to American inventors. For example, this change lowers high
prosecution costs, shortens the lengthy time to obtain a patent, and
harmonizes U.S. patent laws that currently conflict with those from the rest
of the world, particularly with the European Patent Office and the Japan
Patent Office.
Many thorny and subjective problems are subsumed under our present
FTI procedure, such as proving actual reduction to practice; proving due
diligence; proving the absence of suppression, concealment, and
abandonment; 2 and proving the date of conception. 3 These thorny issues
are all
eliminated once the pending FTF law is substituted for the FTI
4
law.'
I understand that the FTF recommendation came from the National
Research Council's report. 5 One of the reasons adduced in the report is
9. See S. Doc. No. 90-5.

10. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2002). For a good discussion of why the United States has
stubbornly and also tenaciously held on to the FTI procedure, see generally F. Scott Kief, The Case
for RegisteringPatentsand the Law andEconomics ofPresentPatent ObtainingRules, 45 B.C. L.
REv. 55, 96 (2003).

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(g).
35 U.S.C. § 102(0 ("he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented").
See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
See NAT'L COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON.,
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that eliminating the FTI law will also end interference proceedings-in
other words, interference litigation-which, as I recall from my early days
as a patent attorney, subjected the American inventor to exorbitant legal
fees just to determine who was the first inventor to reduce the invention to
practice. 6 This high cost was particularly true in cases of chemical and
biotechnology patents.' 7
Therefore, the FTF change" contained in H.R. 2795 would help to
expedite and simplify the granting of a patent and help lower the cost of
obtaining a patent for the majority of inventors affiliated with companies
as well as individual inventors.
In my experience, many individual inventors are precluded from
obtaining a patent for the invention once the invention is challenged in an
opposition proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 135 because the cost of an
opposition proceeding is simply too great. 19 As eminent patent attorney,
Tom Arnold, stated in his April 25, 1974 speech before the New Jersey
Patent Law Association when presented with the Jefferson Medal for his
contribution to the patent system, "[o]ppositions can raise the cost of
getting a patent beyond the level of an applicant's financial capacity for
commitment."2
Andy Klein of the firm Synnestvedt & Lechner indicated at an
American Patent Law Association meeting that in just one of his patent
applications in Japan, he encountered 147 separate oppositions, which
required him to file 147 answering briefs, increasing both the pendency
time and the lawyer's fees involved.2' Assuming that each of the 147
oppositions required a ten-page legal answer to respond to each of the
oppositions, equaling 1,470 pages of response, taking about 1,470 hours
of work, at about $400 per hour, the total price would be approximately

124-27 (Stephen A.
Merrill et al. eds., 2004), available at http://fermat.nap.edu/catalog/10976.html?onpinewsdoc
04192004.
16. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (Interferences).
17. For a discussion of the complex and subjective sub-issues that arise in an interference
proceeding, see generally Charles L. Gholz, A CritiqueofRecent Opinions in PatentInterferences,
85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 401 (2003) [hereinafter Gholz, A Critique].For an overview
of interference practice under § 135, see generally Charles L. Gholz, Interference Practice
Strategies, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 531 (2003) [hereinafter Gholz, Strategies].
18. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).
19. See Steven J. Frank, Patent Reform Cacophony, IEEE SPECTRUM ONLINE (Dec. 2005),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/dec05/2349.
20. Separate Views of Senator Hiram L. Fong to Accompany S.2255, Patent Law Revision,
94th Cong. 253 (1975).
21. Id.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY
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$400 x 1,470, or $588,000-more than half a million dollars in legal
fees-just to respond to an opposition proceeding. 2
The prohibitive cost of the opposition proceedings also can delay the
issuance of a patent for up to two to three years for the individual inventor,
and may delay new, novel, and vital scientific information from being
disclosed and shared with the public.23
Clearly, switching from a FTI to a FTF system will meet all six goals
of the President's Commission on the Patent System, and be particularly
helpful in achieving the second goal, "to shorten the period of application
from filing to final disposition in the Patent Office. 24
B. The Problems Inherent in ContinuationApplications and the Change
On first blush, "continuation" seems like an innocuous subject that
could not cause any serious problems. On the other hand, continuation
clearly does not meet the six goals of the President's Commission on the
Patent System---especially the goal of shortening the time between filing
a patent application and receiving a patent.25 Ordinarily, the average patent
application takes twenty-four to thirty months to prosecute. 26 However, the
patentee may use the continuation procedure to extend unreasonably the
prosecution (pendency) of a patent, to as long as forty-four years-almost
half a century.27
I presided over two patent trials initiated by Dr. Lemelson, the patentee
famous for continuations lasting as long as forty-four years, who decided
to sue the United States for using several of his submarine patents without
having first paid compensation.

22. While "cutting and pasting" repetitive issues and answers may save some legal billing
hours, the patent attorney will still incur substantial extra time.
23. For a discussion of the complex and subjective sub-issues that arise in an interference
proceeding, see generally Gholz, A Critique, supra note 17, at 401. For an overview of interference
practice under § 135, see generally Gholz, Strategies, supra note 17, at 531. For an opposition
proceeding that caused a delay of more than two years in the issuing of a patent, see generally Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 334 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
24. S.Doc. No. 90-5, at 11 (1967).
25. Id.
26. This time period for obtaining a patent was personally experienced by the author while
he was a patent attorney for the Monsanto Chemical Company in the 1960s.
27. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham, Behind the Patent's Veil: Innovator's Uses of Patent
Continuation Practice, 1975-2002, TI:GER Working Paper Series, Oct. 2004, at 9 n. 18, available
attiger.gatech.edu/files/gttigerpatent.pdf; U.S. PatentNo. 5,283,641 (filed June 16, 1993) (issued
Feb. 1,1994) (original application filed Dec. 24, 1954); U.S. Patent No. 5,966,457 (filed Mar. 10,
1992) (issued Oct. 12, 1999) (original application filed Nov. 14, 1955).
28. See Lemelson v.United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 161 (1983); Lemelson v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct.
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"Submarine patents" are held by patentees who delay the issuance of
a patent timed precisely to surprise a mature industry. Lemley and Moore
define submarine patenting as "intentional delay in the issuance of patents
designed to take a mature industry by surprise."29 "Submarine patents" are
so called because they surface to "torpedo" an industry unaware that a
patent is actually covering the apparatus or method it is using.
Congress and the federal courts have created several procedures
designed to combat the misuse of continuation applications.3" In the last
decade, they have changed the term of patents,3 ' ended the secrecy of most
patent applications;32 revived the controversial doctrine of written
description;" 3 and created an entirely new defense the patent infringement:
prosecution laches.34 While these changes have helped curtail some of the
worst abuses of the continuation process, they have failed to cure
completely the problem of continuation practice.
More recently, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has
weighed in on this matter, proposing new rules in January 2006 that would
greatly restrict the use of continuations in patent prosecution. The revised
rules "would require that second or subsequent continued examination
filings... be supported by a showing as to why the amendment, argument,
or evidence presented could not have been previously submitted."35 They

789 (1985). This judge ruled for the defendant in both patent cases. Lemelson, 3 Cl. Ct. At 790.
29. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of PatentContinuations,84 B.U.
L. REV. 63, 79 (2004).
30. It is interesting to note that one of Lemelson's defendants was so angry at him that the
defendant actually charged Lemelson with violating the RICO statute: "Defendant DG by way of
a RICO counterclaim asserts that Lemelson and his agents have, through acts of mail and wire
fraud, unlawfully exploited the U.S. patent system." Lemelson v. Wang Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp.
430, 431 (D. Mass. 1994).
31. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, tit. V, § 532, 108 Stat. 4809,
4983-84 (1994).
32. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B §
1000(a)(9) tit. IV, § 4502, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-561 (1999).
33. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1568-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
34. See Symbol Techs, Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ., 277 F.3d 1361, 1364-66 (Fed. Cir.
2002). The Federal Circuit held that "prosecution laches" is a viable defense based upon a Supreme
Court precedent nearly eighty years in age. See id. at 1364. The defense renders unenforceable
patents that spent an unreasonable amount of time in prosecution without sufficient explanation,
and permits the USPTO to reject applications that have unreasonably been delayed by the applicant.
See id. At 1364-65. The new "prosecution laches" defense may render unenforceable those
submarine patents that were not eliminated by other reform efforts or were filed before the reform
efforts went into effect.
35. Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued Examination
Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. Reg. 48 (proposed Jan.
3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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would also establish a rebuttable presumption that when an applicant or
assignee files multiple applications with the same effective filing date, a
common inventor, and overlapping disclosures, the applications contain
"patentably indistinct"-that is, conflicting-claims.36 In my opinion, this
rule change is also a step in the right direction, but unfortunately, would
also not completely cure the problems inherent in continuation practice.
In my view, one answer to the continuation problem would be to
eliminate "continuation practice" altogether during the prosecution of a
patent application. However, I believe this would be a draconian response
to a legitimate problem which could be more reasonably resolved by more
minimal and practical steps such as requiring publication of all patent
applications; placing a time limit on the addition of new claims that burden
the scope of the invention; and creating a defense for infringers who
independently develop the invention before it was added to the patented
claims. Also' Congress should include in any legislation a reasonable
standard for time spent in prosecution, and indicate that prosecution for a
longer period should establish a rebuttable presumption of prosecution
laches. This would encourage the courts to add some rigor to the
prosecution laches defense by providing a baseline against which any
judge may test the reasonableness of any particular patentee's delays.37
The Federal Circuit recently decided that fourteen of Dr. Lemelson's
patents relating to machine vision and bar code technologies were
unenforceable under the doctrine of prosecution laches.38 The Federal
Circuit, in affirming a decision by the District Court for Nevada, held that
Lemelson's eighteen- to thirty-nine-year delay in executing his patent
claims was unreasonable, and found the patents unenforceable.39 The
Federal Circuit's decision was dated September 9, 2005, after a host of
companies had already paid Dr. Lemelson and his heirs a combined $1.5
billion in licensing fees.' °
Between 1954 and 1956, Lemelson filed patent applications disclosing
methods and an apparatus relating to magnetic recordings. In the following
decades, Lemelson filed continuation-in-part applications for an additional
fourteen patents having to do with bar code technology. From these

36. Id.
37. See generally Lemley & Moore, supra note 29, at 77 n.48 (citing eight Lemelson patents
with prosecution life ranging from 38.76 to 44.33 years).
38. Symbol Techs, Inc. v. Lemelson Med. Educ. & Research Found., 422 F.3d 1378, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
39. Id. at 1386.
40. See Brigid McMenamin, Depth Charge, FORBES, May 13, 2002, at 56 (noting potential
change to patent law based on ancient principle).
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patents, his foundation collected royalties from more than 400 companies
worldwide. His critics alleged that Lemelson had revised his applications
and claims after identifying industry trends, and then laying claims to new
technological trends already in use.
In 1998, the Lemelson Foundation, the current holder of Lemelson's
patents, accused several technology customers, stating that the use of
certain products produced by Symbol Technologies infringed Lemelson's
patents. Symbol Technologies was a major supplier of machine vision
systems and was afraid that it would be forced to indemnify its customers
should any of the patents be found invalid. Accordingly, Symbol
Technologies filed a declaratory judgment action against Lemelson in
response to his accusations of patent infringement. Symbol Technologies
also asserted that the patents were unenforceable by prosecution laches and
inequitable conduct before the USPTO.
The district court, in a decision by U.S. District Judge Phillip Pro,
found that the evidence at trial was abundantly clear that machine vision
and bar code technology had been developed by many inventors who had
never heard of the Lemelson patents.4 ' Moreover, the Federal Circuit,
affirming the district court's reasoning, applied the doctrine of prosecution
laches in finding Lemelson's patents unenforceable.42
The Federal Circuit also found that Lemelson had engaged in "culpable
neglect" during the prosecution of his numerous patent applications.43
Additionally, the federal court recognized the adverse effect on businesses
that were unable to determine what was and was not patented due to a lack
of reasonable notice from the USPTO. Writing for the panel, Judge Alan
Lourie said: "[m]ultiple examples of repetitive refiling that demonstrate
a pattern of unjustifiable delayed prosecution may be held to constitute
laches."
As an aside, the court noted that the lengthy, elapsed time period was
not what the patent statute intended when it allowed for continuation and
continuation-in-part applications. This was the first time that the Federal
Circuit had ever made patents unenforceable under the doctrine of
prosecution laches.45
On a final note, one of Lemelson's corporate defendants in a separate
infringement case was so enraged at what it perceived to be such egregious

41.
1156 (D.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Symbol Techs, Inc. v. Lemelson Med. Educ. & Research Found., 301 F. Supp. 2d 11147,
Nev. 2004).
Symbol Techs, 422 F.3d at 1386.
Id. at 1384-86.
Id. at 1385.
See id. at 1385.
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conduct that it charged Lemelson with violating the RICO statute,
counterclaiming, that he "unlawfully exploited the U.S. patent system by
using it to extort money through threat of legal action." Lemelson's
strategy, though controversial, irregular, and different, was financially
successful; he and his heirs have amassed $1.5 billion in royalties from
licensing his patents."
C. "PriorUser Rights" ProposedChange
Section 273(b) of the current patent code, entitled "Defense to
Infringement," reads:
It shall be a defense to an action for infringement under section 271
of this title [35 U.S.C.S. § 871 ] with respect to any subject matter
that would otherwise infringe one or more claims for a method in
the patent being asserted against a person, if such person had, acting
in good faith, actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least
1 year before the effective filing date of such patent, and
commercially used the subject matter before the effective filing date
of such patent.4
This is called the "first inventor defense" which was first established by
the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999.49
Patent law, however, does not favor trade secret holders who make a
secret commercial use of an invention rather than publicly disclosing their
inventions to advance the useful arts. Therefore, patent law provides that
any inventor who makes a secret commercial use of an invention for more
than one year prior to filing at the USPTO forfeits his right to a patent.5"
This policy is essentially based upon the desire to provide an incentive to
inventors to disclose their invention. They have the right, under trade
secret law, not to disclose their invention-if they believe that it can be

46. Lemelson v. Wang Labs., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 430, 431 (D. Mass. 1994) (RICO
counterclaim filed by Data Gen. Corp.). This opinion dealt strictly with pretrial motions and filings,
and no later history of this case is available, indicating that it was most likely settled out of court.
See id.
47. McMenamin, supra note 40, at 56.
48. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (1999).
49. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B §
1000(a)(9) tit. IV (§ 4302), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-556-57 (1999).
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002); see, e.g., Metallizing Eng'g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing &
Auto Parts Co., Inc., 153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1946).
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kept secret longer than the period of exclusivity granted by the patent
system of twenty years after the filing of the patent application.5
One of the classic examples given by patent law professors is the
formula for Coca-Cola, which The Coca-Cola Company has maintained
as a trade secret. To this day, no one outside of the company knows the
secret recipe to Coca-Cola, but if it had been patented, it would have been
placed in the public domain more than twenty years ago.52 Another
example is the recipe for Kentucky Fried Chicken, also a trade secret that
has been preserved more than twenty years.
However, because trade secrets do not advance the useful arts, the law
does not encourage them, and therefore patent law has established that
prior secret uses do not defeat the patents of later inventors.53 As the
Federal Circuit said in Gore v. Garlock:
Early public disclosure is a linchpin of the patent system. As
between a prior inventor who benefits from a process by selling its
product but suppresses, conceals, or otherwise keeps the process
from the public, and a later inventor who promptly files a patent
application from which the public will gain a disclosure of the
process, the law favors the latter.'
Suppose that Inventor A develops and makes commercial use of a new
manufacturing process. Inventor A does not choose to claim patent
protection, but instead chooses to maintain a trade secret. Many years later,
Inventor B independently develops the same manufacturing process and
promptly files a patent application. Under these circumstances, Inventor
A's earlier trade secret manufacturing process use does not prevent
Inventor B from obtaining a patent. Furthermore, if the USPTO approves
the patent application, then Inventor A faces infringement liability if
Inventor B should file suit against him.
However, the American Inventors Protection Act 5 added a new twist
to this scenario. That statute in part provided a defense for Inventor A if
Inventor A had "a method of conducting business" that was later patented

51. 35 U.S.C. 154(b) (2002).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
54. Id.
55. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9)
[tit. IV (§§ 4001-4808)], 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-556 (1999).
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by Inventor B.56 By limiting this defense to patenting methods of doing
business, Congress responded to the 1998 Federal Circuit opinion of Judge
Rich in State Street Bank." This landmark opinion first recognized that
business methods could be patented, thereby putting in jeopardy
commercial enterprises that had used such business methods but kept them
as trade secrets.
For example, suppose that Inventor A develops and exploits a new
method of doing business, and Inventor A maintains his business method
as a trade secret. Many years later, Inventor B independently develops the
same business method and files a patent. Even following the enactment of
the American Inventors Protection Act, Inventor A's earlier trade secret
use would not prevent Inventor B from procuring a patent. However,
should the USPTO approve Inventor B's patent application, and if
Inventor B should sue Inventor A for infringement, Inventor A may
potentially claim the benefit of the first inventor defense. If successful,
Inventor A would enjoy a complete defense against Inventor B's patent
claim.
As originally enacted, the first inventor defense only applies to patents
claiming a "method of doing or conducting business." Obviously this is a
direct response to the State Street Bank decision that specifically allowed
the use of a "method or process" patent for doing business.5" Although the
American Inventors Protection Act did not define the term, the first
inventor defense was arguably a focused provision, directed to a specific
group of patent infringers.
The pending H.R. 2795 would expand upon the first inventor's defense
by allowing it to apply to all patented subject matter. 9 It would: "(1)
[delete] the requirement for reduction to practice at least one year before
patent filing; (2) delete a limitation to 'methods of doing or conducting
business,' and (3) [extend] prior user rights to 'substantial preparations for
commercial use.""'6 By also removing the current restrictions referring to
"methods of doing business," H.R. 2795 would effectively introduce "all
prior user rights" into U.S. patent law.
56. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b) (1999).
57. See State St. Bank& Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (1998).
58. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
59. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9(a)(2)(A)(i) (2005). The bill
initially would also remove the requirement that the prior use be reduced to practice at least one
year after the effective filing date of patent. See id. at § 9(a)(2)(A)(ii). Under H.R. 2795, the
pending bill, the defense would apply where reduction to practice occurred merely prior to the
patent's filing date. See id.
60. Intellectual Property Owners Association, PatentReform Legislative Summaries, IPO
DAiLY NEWS, Oct. 5, 2005.
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I believe this pending change in the new bill will not "raise the quality
and the reliability of the U.S. Patent,"' because it creates a specter of
uncertainty over all patents. They would be open to challenges by many
unscrupulous competitors who may have invented the invention prior to
the filing date of the patent, but had just kept it secret for a very long time.
This pending change would also not "shorten the period of application
from filing to final disposition of the Patent Office"6' 2 and would not
"accelerate the public disclosure of technological advances" because it
would not motivate people who made inventions to disclose those
inventions to the public so as to advance the science of the useful arts.
To the contrary, it would discourage inventors from coming forth and
revealing their inventions for the advancement of the useful arts, and
encourage them to keep the inventions secret for their own profitable use.
The pending change would not "reduce the expenses of litigation,"63 since
it would increase litigation and encourage competitors to challenge a
patent by simply asserting that they found someone who made an
invention prior to the filing date.
Therefore, this particular pending change would not meet the goals of
the President's Commission on the Patent System,' 4 but would fail, thereby
earning disfavor toward the pending change.65 Obtaining a patent and
exercising the exclusive rights associated with the patent are rights that our
Founding Fathers felt
were very important to the foundation of our
6
society.
commercial
D. The Injunction Controversy and the Change
Under present law, courts with proper jurisdiction over patent
infringement cases "may grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any rights secured by
patent, on such terms as a court deems reasonable.'6 7 H.R. 2795, the
pending Patent Act, would add the following additional language to the
statute:

61. S.Do.No.90-5,at9-11 (1967).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 11-12.
64. Id.
65. For a good discussion, see generally Prior User Rights, 34 IDEA 117 (1994); Carl
Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017
(2004).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006); see also Brief for Respondents at 15, 20, 27; EBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 773 (2005) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 622506.
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In determining equity, the court shall consider the fairness of the
remedy in light of all the facts and the relevant interests of the
parties associated with the invention. Unless the injunction is
entered pursuant to a nonappealable judgment of infringement, a
court shall stay the injunction pending an appeal upon an
affirmative showing that the stay would not result in irreparable
harm to the owner of the patent and that the balance of hardships
from the stay does not favor the owner of the patent.6"
Under current law, the courts ordinarily grant permanent injunctions to
parties that prevail in infringement litigation at the trial court level. As the
Federal Circuit recently remarked:
Because the "right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the
essence of the concept of property," the general rule is that a
permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have
been adjudged [by the trial judge]. To be sure, "courts have in rare
instances exercised their discretion to deny injunctive relief in order
to protect the public interest."' 9
"Thus, we have stated that a court may decline to enter an injunction when
'a patentee's failure to practice the patented invention frustrates an
important public need for the invention,' such as the need to use an
invention to protect public health."70
Only a few judicial opinions have declined to grant injunctions against
adjudicated patent infringers under present law. The usual exception cited
as a precedent is City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc.,71 where the
Seventh Circuit refused to enjoin the infringement of a method patent for
sewage treatment.72 If the City of Milwaukee had been prevented from
using the patent invention, it would have been forced to dump large
quantities of raw sewage into Lake Michigan. Observing that "the health
and the lives of more than half a million people are involved," the circuit
court denied the requested injunction. 73 Likewise, in Vitamin Technologists
68. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005).
69. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see Roche Prods.,
Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865-66 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("standards of the public interest,
not the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief').
70. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3D 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (internal
citations omitted); Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1547.
71. 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934).
72. Id. at 593.
73. Id.
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v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found,74 involving a patent claiming a
method of irradiating foods to increase Vitamin D content, and thus
helping to prevent rickets in poor children, the circuit court discussed the
concept that injunctions should be refused if they would compromise
public health concerns."
1. Some Trial Courts Have Delayed the Effective
Date of the Injunctions
Some courts have taken a different procedure by delaying the effective
date of a permanent injunction rather than refusing it altogether. In
Schneider (Europe)AG v. SciMed Life Systems, Inc.,7 6 the adjudicated
infringer marketed a rapid exchange catheter used by surgeons. While the
court found no evidence in the record that the infringing product was more
safe or superior to other catheters on the market, the court recognized that
some physicians strongly preferred the infringing product. Moved by
pragmatism, the court opted to grant a permanent injunction effective one
year after the grant of judgment. The district court reasoned that a yearlong transition period would allow physicians to switch from the infringing
product with minimal disruption, at least, in comparison with the
immediate imposition of an injunction. The district court provided that the
patentee would receive an escalating royalty during the transition period,
thereby giving the infringer a compulsory license, with increasing
royalties, for a twelve-month term."
2. BlackBerry Service Would Not Be Affected
In a very recent case, a U.S. District Judge stopped short of making a
decision to issue an injunction against Canadian technology company,
Research In Motion (RIM), and halting its BlackBerry wireless e-mail
service to three million users, after holding that its device infringed the
claims of five patents held by NTP, Inc., a patent holding company in
Northern Virginia." In 2003, the Judge granted an injunction that would
have stopped the U.S. sales of BlackBerry devices and shut down
BlackBerry service, but stayed the injunction pending the appeal.79 NTP

74. 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945).
75. Id. at 946.
76. 852 F. Supp. 813 (D. Minn. 1994).
77. Id. at 862.
78. Matt Walcoff, RIM's Day ofJudgment, THE RECORD (Kitchener-Waterloo, Ont.), Feb.
24, 2006, at Al.
79. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No. Civ.A. 3:01CV767, 2003 WL 23100881, at
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had filed a patent infringement suit against RIM in 2001 in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. As a result, ajury found
for NTP in 2003, and the parties reached a tentative settlement of $450
million in 2005.80
It is interesting to note that immediately after RIM lost its patent
case-once the jury held the five NTP patents valid and infringed by
RIM-it went on the offensive by filing requests for USPTO
reexamination of all five NTP patents used in the trial court's decision.8
If RIM could persuade the USPTO to declare these five patents not valid,
they could defeat the trial court's decision against them, without ever
having to go back to court!82
In fact, in early March 2006, the incredible did happen. Despite the
USPTO temporarily holding NTP's five patents invalid, worthless, and
unable to legally threaten RIM's patents on BlackBerry service, RIM
nonetheless settled with NTP for $612.5 million. 3
3. Concerns Over Injunctions
Some writers have expressed concerns over the current state of patent
injunction law. It has been observed that, although the patent statute
mandates courts to "grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of
equity,' 84 in practice most courts "virtually automatically" issue
injunctions in favor of the victorious patent proprietor.85
In the view of some writers, this scenario has encouraged
nonconstructive behavior by some speculators. These speculators do not

*1-2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2003).
80. Walcoff, supra note 78, at Al.
81. U.S. Patent No. 5,436,960, Reexam. C.N. 90/006,675 (requested June 24, 2003); U.S.
Patent No. 5,438,611, Reexam. C.N. 90/006,676 (requested June 24, 2003); U.S. Patent No.
5,479,472, Reexam. C.N. 90/006,677 (requested June 24, 2003); U.S. Patent No. 5,625,670,
Reexam. C.N. 90/006,678 (requested June 24, 2003); U.S. Patent No. 5,631,946, Reexam. C.N.
90/006,679 (requested June 24, 2003); U.S. Patent No. 5,819,172, Reexam. C.N. 90/006,680
(requested June 24, 2003); U.S. Patent No. 6,067,451, Reexam. C.N. 90/006,681 (requested June
24, 2003).
82. Walcoff, supra note 78, at Al.
83. $612 Million Settlement Announced in Patent Case, THE VIRGINIAN-PILoT (Norfolk,
Va.), Mar. 4, 2006, at D1.The only scintilla of a threat left in NTP's legal arsenal was one appeal
to the Federal Circuit, where the odds would favor the USPTO because no additional evidence
could be introduced at that level.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
85. See W. David Westergard, Remedying the Growing Abuse of the Patent System Through
Targeted Legislation, in CONFERENCE PAPERS ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AND POLICY (Fordham Law School, Mar. 31, 2005).
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themselves provide goods and services, and thus do not acquire their
patents in order to protect their own markets; rather, they are said to use
patents to threaten legitimate manufacturers and service providers.8 6
Because such unproductive speculators may legally threaten to halt the use
of patented inventions entirely, by use of their paper patents, the accused
infringers may enter into a license for these paper patents in order not to
lose business and money. 7 This practice is often called "trolling," after the
creatures from folklore who would emerge from under a bridge in order
to waylay travelers and seek a toll for crossing the bridge. 8
Other writers take a contrary viewpoint, observing that not all patentees
who choose not to practice their inventions are opportunistic speculators.
For instance, some individuals or firms may lack the expertise or resources
to produce a patented product, or have other sound business reasons not to
do so, such as lack of funding. In addition, the Federal Circuit explained,
"[a] patent is granted in exchange for a patentee's disclosure of an
invention, not for the patentee's use of the invention. There is no
requirement in this country that a patentee make, use, or sell its patented
invention."89
Still, other patent commentators view patents as time-limited property
rights.9" Under this view, infringers must be properly enjoined so that the
patent owner's exclusive rights to make, use, or sell, its patented invention
may be preserved. Failing to enjoin infringers may also diminish the
incentives needed by investment bankers who would otherwise assist the
patentee with development of his invention.
Viewing a patent as a property right arguably suggests that an
injunction is a suitable remedy for a violation of that right, and that these
alternative conceptions of the patent grant do not so strongly imply that
courts should enjoin infringers as a matter of course. It is interesting to
note that even traditional properties such as real estate, are prospectively
subject to numerous limitations, including but not limited to easements,
zoning restrictions, servitudes, and inverse condemnation.

86. See Lemley & Moore, supra note 29, at 79-80.
87. See id.
88. See Loraine Woelert, A Patent War is BreakingOut on the Hill, Bus. WEEK, July 4, 2005,
at 45.
89. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
90. SeegenerallyFrank H. Easterbrook,lntellectualPropertyIsStillProperty,13 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 108 (1990).
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E. Injunctions, Limitations Upon Damagesand the Change
H.R. 2795, the pending bill, also addresses the award of damages
where the patented invention forms but one component of the infringer's
larger commercial product or process:
In determining a reasonable royalty in the case of a combination,
the court shall consider, if relevant and among other factors, the
portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the
inventive contribution as distinguished from other features of the
combination, the manufacturing process, business risks, or
significant features or improvements added by the infringer.9
The proposed "reform" appears to be directed toward concerns about
overly generous damage awards in this context. As a federal court
adduced:
[I]nventors have learned to abuse the patent system and increase
leverage against manufacturers by pursuing "system claims" in the
[USPTO]. These clever claims insert the crux of the predator's
"innovation" into the larger context than that to which the inventor
is rightfully entitled. For example, the abuser may actually have
invented a hinge mechanism, but draws the patent claim to a door
including the hinge mechanism. In this example, the door, is well
known to, and long in use, by the public, but in the subsequent
litigation, the patent predator claims entitlement to, and the court
awards, damages based on the entire value of the door rather than
on the value of the innovative hinge.92
The second observation by the Federal Circuit sheds further light on
this proposed reform, H.R. 2795:
Virtually all patents are "combination patents," if by that label one
intends to describe patents having claims to inventions formed of
a combination of elements. It is difficult to visualize, at least in the
mechanical-structural arts, a "non-combination" invention, i.e., an
invention consisting of a single element. Such inventions, if they
exist, are rare indeed. 93

91. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005).
92. See Westergard, supra note 85, at 7 (citation omitted).
93. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis in
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Under this second observation, this legislative proposal is full of
potentially broad applications. In addition, the required assessment or
evaluation of the "inventive contribution" of a single element to a patented
combination-rather than base its damages determined upon the claims
themselves-would make a chaotic change in U.S. patent law. As the
Federal Circuit recently stated, "[i]t is well settled that 'there is no legally
recognizable or protected essential element, gist or heart of the invention
in a combination patent."' Rather, "'[t]he invention is defined by the
claims."' 94
I am aware of opposition by not-for-profit universities and similar
associations, whereby they claim that the proposed changes in the law
governing injunctive relief constitutes "a tilting of the playing field in
favor of infringers over the interests of universities, small businesses, and
'
start-up companies."95
F. Nine-Month PublicationChange
1. Old Law
Patent law prior to 1995 allowed the applicant to extend his period of
secrecy virtually ad infinitum. At that time, the patent term was seventeen
years after issue, with no requirement that the application be published,
thereby allowing a patentee to protect the original priority date for many
years from the beginning of the patent application to the final period of its
issuance. However, in 1995, Congress changed the law for measuring the
term of a patent, intending with the legislation to alter the incentives for
applicants to use continuation patents. In part to harmonize America's law
with the laws of its international trading partners, the new patent law
increased the patent term from seventeen to twenty years. 96 Partly in order
to eliminate or dissuade the use of submarine strategies (Lemelson

original).
94. Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal
citations omitted).
95. See Patent Act of 2005: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property, 109th Congress (2005) (Statement of Carie GuIbransen, Managing Director,
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation); Comment on H.R. 2795 submitted to Rep. Lamar Smith,
Chairman, House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, June
23, 2005 [hereinafter Association Testimony]. The same comments were submitted to the Senate
Judicary Committee, Subcommittee on Intellectual Property. See Patent Act of 2005: Hearings on
H.R. 2795 before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, 109th Congress
(2005) (statement of Charles E. Phelps, Univ. of Rochester).
96. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002).
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strategies),97 the new patent act offered patentees some additional dejure
length, but required that the longer patent term be measured from the
application date to the issue date. 98 For all practical purposes, this change
reduced the patent term for all applications pending in the USPTO for
greater than three years.99 This change in the patent term was intended to
eliminate submarine patent incentives by forcing the patentee to "trade
off" secrecy for extended protection.
In 1999, the American Inventors Protection Act"° required that
applications be published after eighteen months, thus bringing the U.S.
patent laws on publication into harmony with the patent laws of major
foreign jurisdictions.' However, lobbying by small and independent
inventors created the following loophole: patent applications made in the
United States, and not also filed in a foreign country, were exempted from
the U.S. publication requirement in eighteen months." 2 Thus, if a U.S.
applicant waived his right to file in all foreign countries, he would not
have his patent application published after eighteen months, rather it
would remain secret the whole time, if it survived prosecution by the
USPTO. °3 According to USPTO reports and data, only sixty-five percent
of applications filed in 2001 have been published, that is, only sixty-five
percent of applicants have said that they would also file their particular
application abroad. "04
2. Present Law
Under section 122 of the patent statute:
[E]ach application for a patent shall be published in accordance
with procedures determined by the Director, promptly after the
expiration of a period 18 months from the earliest filing date for
which a benefit is sought under this title. At the request of the

97.
98.
99.
100.
(1999).

Lemley & Moore, supra note 29, at 80.
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2002).
Id.
Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9) tit. IV § 4502, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-561-62

101. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2000).
102. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
103. See id.
104. See U.S.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PATENTS: INFORMATION ABOUT THE PUBLICATION

PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICAN INVENTOR PROTECTION ACT 4 (2004).
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applicant, an application may be published earlier than the end of
such 18-month period." 5
Section 122 also sets forth exceptions for the eighteen-month
mandatory publication. They are:
1. no longer pending;
2. subject to a secrecy order under section 181 of this title;
3. if provisional application filed under section 111 (b) of this title;
or
4. an
application for a design patent filed under chapter 16 of this
title.'
06

The statute goes on to say in section 122(b)(2)(B)(i):
[I]f an applicant makes a request upon filing, certifying that the
invention disclosed in the application, has not and will not be the
subject of an application filed in another country, or under a multilateral international agreement, that requires publication of
applications 18 months after filing, the applications shall not be
published as provided in paragraph (1).1 °7
3. Pending Legislation
The proposed patent reform would require that all U.S. patent
applications be published eighteen months after the application's earliest
priority date. This would ensure the timely notice of inventions and intent
to patent, allowing competitors to avoid potential infringement problems.
It also requires public disclosure of the invention before the patent is
granted. This reform, however, would eliminate an opportunity for U.S.
applicants to test the waters of patent protection and competition. For
example, if early prosecution suggests that a patent is too hard to obtain
from the patent office, the applicant may opt to abandon the patent
application, and because the application is still secret, he can retain the
trade secret and protect it from discovery as a trade secret. Under present
law, the applicant still has the option to keep the invention a trade secret,
such as Coca-Cola's secret formula and KFC's formula for its eleven herbs
and spices.

105. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) (2000).
107. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000).
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G. Limitation on Damages Change
1. Present Law
Present law covered under section 287 of the patent statute entitled
"Limitation on Damages and Other Remedies; Marking and Notices"
speaks about damages as a whole package and does not attempt to dissect
this package into smaller discrete packages. Section 287(a) states that
Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within
the United States any patented article for or under them, or
importing any patented article into the United States, may give
notice to the public that the same is patented, either by fixing
thereon the word "patent" or the abbreviation "pat.", together with
the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the article,
this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one
or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.'
Section 287(b)(2) goes on to say that
No remedies for infringement under section 271 (g) of this title shall
be available with respect to any product in the possession of, or in
transit to, the person subject to liability under such section before
that person had notice of infringement with respect to that product.
The person subject to liability shall bear the burden of proving any
such possession or transit."
Section 287(b)(3)(A) states further,
[I]n making a determination with respect to the remedy in an action
brought for infringement under section 271(g), the court shall
consider(i)
(ii)

the good faith demonstrated by the defendant with respect to
a request for disclosure,
the good faith demonstrated by the plaintiff with respect to
a request for disclosure, and

108. 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1999),
109. 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(2) (1999).
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(iii)

the need to restore the exclusive rights secured by the
patent.110

The present statute also has a time limitation on damages in section
286, which states "no recovery shall be had for any infringement
committed more than six years prior to the filing
of the complaint or
11
counterclaim for infringement in the action.""
2. Pending Legislation
The pending legislation would also address the award of damages
where the patented invention forms only one component of the infringer's
larger commercial product or process. As explained by H.R. 2795,
In determining a reasonable royalty in the case of a combination,
the court shall consider, if relevant and among other factors, the
portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the
inventive contribution as distinguished from other features of the
combination, the manufacturing process, business risks, or
significant features or improvements added by the infringer." 2
The proposed reform appears to be directed toward correcting the
overly generous damages awarded for patent infringement where, for
example, the patented infringement only occurs in five percent of a
combination patent but ninety-five percent of the combination is not
infringed. One writer has asserted:
[I]nventors have learned to abuse the patent system and increase
leverage against manufacturers by pursuing "system claims" in the
Patent and Trademark Office. These clever claims insert the crux of
the predator's "innovation" into much larger contexts than that to
which the inventor is rightfully entitled. For example, the abuser
may actually have invented a hinge mechanism, but draws the
patent claim to a door including the hinge mechanism. In this
example, the door is well known to, and long in use by, the public,
but in the subsequent litigation, the patent predator claims

110. 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(3)(A) (1999).
111. 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2006).
112. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005).
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entitlement to, and the court awards, damages based on the entire
value of the door rather than on the value of the innovative hinge. "3
To throw more light on this prospective reform, we turn to the Federal
Circuit, which has explained that:
[V]irtually all patents are "combination patents", if by that label
one intends to describe patents having claims to inventions formed
of a combination of elements. It is difficult to visualize, at least in
the mechanical-structural arts, a "non-combination" invention, i.e.,
an invention consisting of a single element. Such inventions, if they
exist, are rare indeed." 4
Under this viewpoint, this legislative proposal is of very generic and
broad application. Further the required assessment of "inventive
contribution" of a patented combination-rather than base its damages
determination upon the claims themselves-would mark a radical change
in America's patent laws. As the Federal Circuit recently stated, "[I]t is
well settled that "there is no legally recognizable or protected 'essential'
element, 'gist' or 'heart' of the invention in a combination patent." Rather,
"'[t]he invention' is defined by the claims.""' 5
3. The President's Commission
It would appear that the imposition of the mandatory task upon the
federal judge of determining what "portion of the realizable profit that
should be credited to the inventive contribution as distinguished from other
features of the combination, the manufacturing process, business risks, or
significant features or improvements added by the infringer"' 6 adds a
speculative and subjective task for the federal judge that would tend to
substantially lengthen the deliberation procedure on damages for the judge.
This lengthy addition to what is already a longer period of time than

113. Prospectives on Patents: Hearing before Judiciary Subcomm. on the Judiciary Subcomm.
on Intellectual Prop. on "Perspectives on Patents," 109th Cong., at 8-9 (2005) (statement of Joel
L. Poppen, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Micron Tech., Inc.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfin?id= 1475&witid=423 1.
114. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis in
original).
115. Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
116. H.R. 2795§6.
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usual,"17 would substantially expand the disposition of a patent lawsuit,
thereby increasing the expense of patent litigation.
Any facet of patent litigation that is expanded will also have a
concomitant increase in cost, thereby not meeting one of the six goals of
the President's Commission on the Patent System, that is to reduce the
expenses of litigation. Litigation expenses would have to increase merely
because another factor has to be addressed by the judge and the two parties
at trial. This particular factor, while not being essential to a patent claim,
nevertheless, may give a damage assessment that would be more fair and
equitable. However, it is not clear whether this added factor in the patent
litigation damage formula would be better overall in meeting the Six Goals
of the President's Commission. It definitely does not meet Goal No. 4: "to
reduce the expense of obtaining and litigating a patent.""
H. Elimination of Best Mode Change
1. Present Law
In 35 U.S.C. § 112, titled "Specification" and comprising six
paragraphs, the first paragraph, which refers to the "best mode," reads as
follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art, to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention. "9
It is interesting to note that Professor Harold C. Wegner believes that
section 112 of the 1952 Patent Act was drafted in a "geographical vacuum,
with unique and creative solutions
sought that found no basis in the
120
practice of any foreign country.'

117. This judge always found that patent cases took longer than the other ordinary type of
lawsuit and particularly lawsuits for a sum certain based upon contracts.
118. See S. Doc. No. 90-5, at 12 (1967).
119. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (emphasis added).
120. Harold C. Wegner, The DisclosureRequirements of the 1952 PatentAct: Looking Back
and a New Statutefor the Next Fifty Years, 37 AKRON L. REv. 243, 244 (2004). He was also the
former Director of the Patent Law LL.M. program at the George Washington School of Law, in

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW& POLICY

[Vol. I11

Accordingly, inventors are required to "set forth the best mode
' Failure to
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention."121
disclose the best mode known to the inventor would be grounds for
invalidating the issued patent. The patent courts have established a twopart test for analyzing whether an inventor has disclosed his or her best
mode for a particular patent. The first question is whether the inventor
knew of a way of utilizing the claimed invention that he considered
superior to any other-in other words, the best mode. If so, then the patent
specification must verify and disclose sufficient information to enable one
skilled in the art to practice the best mode.'22
Supporters of the best mode requirement have asserted that it allows
the public to use the most advantageous implementation of the technology
known to the inventor. Accordingly, this disclosure becomes part of the
patent specification and may be freely reviewed by those who wish to
design around the patented invention. It is therefore said that members of
with the
the public, specifically competitors, are better able to compete
1 23
patentee on an equal playing field after the patent expires.
However, the best mode requirement has encountered severe criticism
in recent years. 124 For example, in 1992, a presidential commission
recommended that Congress eliminate the best mode requirement. The
Commission argued that patents are statutorily required to disclose "the
manner and process of making and using [the invention] in such full, fair,
concise and exact terms to enable any person skilled in the arts ... to make
and use the same."'2 5 This requirement called "enablement" was believed
to provide sufficient information to achieve the patent law's policy goals
of informing all competitors about the manner and means of inventing
around the patent.

Washington, D.C.
121. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).

122. See, e.g., Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 926-29 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
123. See Jerry R. Selinger, In Defense of "Best Mode": Preservingthe Benefit of the Bargain
for the Public,43 CATH. U. L. REV. 1071, 1097 (1994).

124. See, e.g., Steven B. Walmsley, Best Mode: A Plea to Repair or Sacrifice This Broken
Requirementof UnitedStates PatentLaw, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 125, 156-60 (2002);
Wegner, supra note 120, at 243-44; see generally Tressa Jennifer James, Implicationsof the Best
Mode Requirement on Patents Involving Biotechnology, 2 HouS. Bus. & TAX L.J. 96, 100-13

(2002); see Toshiko Takenaka, The Best Patent Practiceor Mere Compromise? A Review of the
Current Draft of the Substantive Patent Law Treaty and a Proposalfor a "First-To-Invent"
Exceptionfor DomesticApplicants, 11 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 259, 287 (2003).

125. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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The Commission further indicated that the best mode requirement
increases the costs and complexity of patent litigation. As the Commission
explained:
The disturbing rise in the number of best mode challenges over the
past 20 years may serve as an indicator that the best mode defense
is being used primarily as a procedural tactic. A party currently can
assert failure to satisfy the best mode requirement without any
significant burden. This assertion also entitles that a party may seek
discovery on the "subjective beliefs" of the inventors prior to the
filing date of the patent application. This broad authority provides
ample opportunities for discovery abuse. Given the fluidity by
which the requirement is evaluated (e.g., even accidental failure to
disclose any superior element, setting, or step can negate the
validity of the patent), and the wide ranging opportunities for
discovery, it is almost certain that a1 best
mode challenge will
26
survive at least initial judicial scrutiny.
The Commission also reasoned that the best mode at the time of filing
for a patent is unlikely to remain the best mode when the patent expires
many years later. Because no other patent laws also require the best mode,
foreign inventors have questioned the desirability of the best mode
requirement in general, and have found the best mode requirement a
weakness in U.S. patent laws.
The harbinger of the "best mode" problem was revealed by the Federal
Circuit in a series of opinions, the first dealing with two Enzo Biochem
opinions from 2002 and ending with a Gentry Gallery opinion.
2. Enzo Biochem I
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc. (Enzo 1),'" the Federal
Circuit was faced with a summary judgment ruling that a patent would be
invalid for failure to be in compliance with the written description
requirement of section 112. The Federal Circuit held that the district court
properly granted summary judgment because the "patent described the
claimed nucleotide sequences only by their function, which is insufficient

126. THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON PATENT REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE 101 (1992).

127. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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to meet the requirement of § 112. '28 The Federal Circuit also upheld the
judge's finding that the "expert's opinion that the deposited genetic
materials could actually have been sequenced, did not cure the actual
failure of the inventor to identify the invention by some distinguishing
characteristic, such as their structure." The Court held further that the in
ipsis verbis support for the claims in the specification did not per se
establish compliance with the written description requirement. The Federal
Circuit agreed with the district court's holding that Enzo's "possession" of
three nucleotide sequences that it had reduced to practice and deposited,
nevertheless, did not satisfy the written description requirement of section
112, paragraph 1. Section 112, of course, requires
a written description of the invention, and the manner and process
of making and using it, in such full, clear, and concise terms to
enable any person skilled in the art by which it pertains or with
which it is most nearly connected to, to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the "best mode" contemplated by the inventor for
carrying on the invention.'29
Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the trial judge was correct in holding
that the written description required by the patent code, section 112,
paragraph 1, was not met, and therefore, the "best mode" requirement was
not fulfilled, and accordingly, the patent was not valid.
3. Enzo Biochem II
In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe,Inc. (Enzo I1), the Federal Circuit
reversed itself based upon a dissenting opinion by Circuit Judge Dike in
its Enzo I opinion on July 15, 2002. 130
In Enzo II, the Federal Circuit held that the District Judge erred in
granting summary judgment, and finding that the claim composition
matter was defined only by its biological activity or function, that is, the
ability to hybridize to end gonorrheain a ratio of about five with respect
to N. meningitides, which it held was insufficient to satisfy section 112,
128. Id. at 10 15-16. For a good discussion of the unique problems presented by advanced
biotechnology and pharmaceutical patents, see generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1577 (2003) (stating that "the [patent] rules actually
applied to different industries increasingly diverge. The best examples of such divergence are found
in biotechnology... where the courts have applied the common legal standards of obviousness,
enablement, and written description to reach radically different results").
129. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
130. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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paragraph 1. The District Court had rejected Enzo's argument that the
reference in this specification of biological materials in a public depository
'inherently disclosed' that the inventors were in possession of the claimed
sequences.13 ' Enzo pointed out that the question of whether Enzo complied
with the written description required by section 112 was a question of fact,
and not a question of law. Enzo argued that "the testimony of its expert,
Dr. Wetmer, raised a genuine factual issue whether the reference to the
deposits inherently described the claimed nucleotide sequences." In
addition, Enzo argued that the "description of the binding affinity of the
claimed nucleotide sequences [satisfied]" the written requirement set forth
under section 112.
The defendant, on the other hand, responded that the patent described
the claimed nucleotide sequences only by their function, which was
insufficient to meet the requirements of section 112, paragraph 1. In its
opinion regarding section 112, paragraph 1, the Federal Circuit interpreted
that section as requiring a "description" of an invention separate from the
enablement. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit recognized the severability
of the "written description" and the "enablement" provisions of section
112, paragraph 1. The Federal Circuit also had difficulty in Regents v. Eli
Lilly in defining what is required for a written description as to
biotechnology patents in which a gene material has been defined only by
its statement of function or result. In that case, the Federal Circuit held that
such a statement as to function or result alone did not adequately describe
the claimed invention, that is, did not comply with section 112, paragraph
1 requirement for a written description or best mode. 32
4. The Gentry Gallery Case
In Gentry Gallery v. Berkline Corp.,'33 the Federal Circuit held that a
"written description" requirement that proscribed presenting a generic
claim that was fully supported by the specification where the specification
indicated that a sub-generic embodiment was considered to be the
invention of the application. For example, where the original claims are all
directed to a combination of A and B, if there were features in an A-B
combination invention, and A alone was novel, then the applicant has the
right to the generic claim that comprises A alone, which means that it may
cover A by itself, or A with B. Perhaps the specification claims that B was
a critical component to a successful commercial realization of the

131. Id. at 962.
132. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
133. 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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invention. This may enhance the patentability to a claim of the A-B
combination, but the patent applicant should be entitled to claim A
alone-in addition to whatever claims he or she may wish to present to B.
Thus, we see that the Federal Circuit in subsequent cases has had
problems with the best mode requirement and written description
requirement of section 112 in recent years despite the fact that the
problems did not arise earlier because of the simpler inventions around the
time of the 1952 Act. However, after several decades passed, it became
clear that with the issues that arose in the field of biotechnology, the
question of whether the requirement of the written description would be
fulfilled merely by mentioning a function of the invention caused a split
of opinion in the Federal Circuit, and perhaps called for a change in the
law.
I. Continuationof Injunctions Change
In general, companies in high technology industries, such as computer
software and financial services, typically offer products and services that
utilize a multiplicity of patents, that is, a large number of patents are used
to protect their method or product. These companies perceive a threat of
devastating consequences from having their businesses shut down by an
injunction that might issue from a finding of infringement from any one
of a hundred patents that might be implicated in a single product or service
they offer, or similar consequences from a damage award that far exceeds
the contribution of the infringing patent to the value of the final product. 34
J. Post Issuance PriorArt by ThirdPartiesChange or Reexamination
Although the U.S. patent system does not currently include the
procedure for submitting prior art by third parties after the patent has
issued, the patent system has incorporated a so-called reexamination
may be viewed as the seminal gestation of
proceeding since 1980, which
"post-issuance procedure."' 35 Many patent commentators have viewed the
reexamination proceeding as a limited form of an opposition proceeding.
Under the reexamination statute, any individual, including the patentee, a
competitor, or the USPTO director, may send a prior art patent or

134. See, e.g., Walcoff, supra note 78, at Al (regarding BlackBerry shutdown).
135. For a brief history of the reexamination system in the United States, see Haitao Sun, PostGrantPatentInvalidationin China andin the United States, Europe, andJapan:A Comparative
Study, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 273, 307 (2004).
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publication to the USPTO. Under present law, relevant prior art patents or
publications may be derived from anywhere in the world.'36
The USPTO then determines whether this prior art reference raises a
"substantial new question of patentability" with respect to an issued patent;
and if so, it will reopen the prosecution of the issued patent. 137 The most
relevant section in the present patent code is section 301, entitled "Citation
of [P]rior [A]rt," which reads:
Any person at any time may cite to the Office in writing prior art
consisting of patents or printed publications which that person
believes to have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a
particular patent. If the person explains in writing the pertinency
and manner of applying such prior art to at least one claim of the
patent, the citation of such prior art and the explanation thereof will
become a part of the official file of the patent. At the written
request of the person citing the prior art, his or her identity will be
excluded from the patent file and kept confidential. 138
The present reexamination procedure is a limited reexamination
procedure that presently allows third parties to present or submit relevant
prior art (publications or patents) to the USPTO, while not unreasonably
interfering with the due diligence of the examiner and the progress of the
patent application to final issuance.
The seeds of today's law of reexamination procedure were sown in
1975 by Sen. Hiram L. Fong in his bill S. 214,1"9 which this Judge drafted
and which contained a chapter 31 entitled "Prior Art Citations to the Patent
Office and Reexamination of Patents."'" Section 112 of that bill was the
harbinger of section 301 of the current patent code:
Any person may, at any time within the period of enforceability of
a patent, cite to the Office prior patents or publications which may
have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of the patent,
provided that the person citing such prior art identify in writing the
parts of the same considered pertinent, and the manner of applying
the same to at least one claim of the patent. The writing identifying
and applying the same shall become a part of the official file of the

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2002).
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (2006).
35 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
S. 214, 94th Cong. (1975).
Id. ch. 31.
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patent. The identity of the person citing the prior art shall be
41
excluded from such file upon his request to remain anonymous.1
The present legislation would radically change the reexamination
concept to the point that it would become a post-issuance opposition
proceeding, never before incorporated into U.S. patent law. Opposition
proceedings, while common in foreign patent regimes, are in fact patent
revocation proceedings that are administered by a national patent office,
and often involve a wide range of potential invalidity arguments which
would take a prolonged and unreasonable time and incur exacerbating and
unreasonable costs for the small inventors and not-for-profit university
inventors.
The traditional reexamination proceeding, I believe, is more than
adequate to allow third parties to make prior art submissions to the
USPTO. These reexamination proceedings are currently conducted in an
accelerated fashion on an ex parte basis. In addition, following the
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999,142 an interpartesexamination
now also allows the requester to participate more fully in the proceedings
with the submission of arguments and the filing of appeals. Many of the
foreign reexamination proceedings "may result in a certificate confirming
the patentability of the original claims, an amended
patent with narrow
143
claims, or a declaration of patent invalidity.'
K. Pre-IssuanceSubmissions by ThirdParties Change
For a very long time after the 1952 Patent Act, third parties were
denied pre-issue submissions to the Patent Office because the application
was kept secret until the application issued as a patent. However, when
Congress enacted the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999,1" the
USPTO provided that a patent application would not be published in
eighteen months as long as the patentee swore under oath that the
application would not be filed in a foreign country. If the patent
application were to be filed in a foreign country, the patentee would have
his or her application published in the United States within eighteen
months. 145 Accordingly, through rulemaking, the USPTO established a
141. Id. § 112.
142. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B, §
1000(a)(9) tit. IV § 4604, 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-556-57 (1999).
143. John R. Thomas, Collusionand CollectiveAction in the Patent System: A Proposalfor
PatentBounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 326-27 (2001).
144. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 § 4302.
145. Id.
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limited procedure for members of the public to submit information, to the
USPTO, prior to the issuance of a patent, that they believed was more
pertinent. The submitted information consisted of either a patent or printed
publication, and it was required to have been submitted within two months
of the date that the USPTO published the pending application. Since
November 29, 2000, U.S. Patent applications have been published eighteen
months from the date of filing 46 under certain circumstances, that is, that
the U.S. patent application was also filed in a foreign country. However,
non-documentary information that may be relevant to the patentability
determination, such as sales or public use of the invention, would not be
considered or accepted by the Patent Office.'4 7
Note that because Congress stipulated that no protests or pre-grant
opposition may occur without the consent of the patent holder, the USPTO
has explained that it will not accept comments or explanations concerning
the submitted patents or printed publications. If these comments are
attached to the pre-issue submissions by the third parties, the USPTO staff
will redact them before the submitted documents are forwarded to the
examiner.'48
L. The ProposedChanges in the Law
H.R. 2795, the pending bill, would greatly expand the possibility for
pre-issuance submissions by third parties. Under this bill, any person
would be allowed to submit patent documents and other printed
publications to the USPTO for its consideration.'49 The prior art must be
submitted within the earlier date of either: (1) the date the USPTO issued
a notice of allowance to the patent applicant; or (2) six months after the
date of pre-grant publication of the application, thus extending the time
four months, or the date of rejection of any claim by the USPTO
examiner. 5 ° In addition, such a submission must include a "concise
description of the asserted relevance of each submitted document," thus
giving a chance for the person who submits the pre-issuance submission
to give his or her written argument
as to its relevance.' This presently is
52
law.'
our
under
not allowed

146. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 122(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(B)(i) & (b)(iv) (2000).
147. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.99(d) (2006).
148. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE

§ 1134.01 (8th ed. May 2004).
149. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 10 (2005).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. For a good discussion of potential solutions to the present problem, see generally Qin Shi,
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Some commentators have suggested an even broader type of inter
partes reexamination which would allow an open-door attack on the
validity of a patent such as permitted in section 337 proceedings at the
U.S. International Trade Commission, where I once worked as a lead
appellate patent counsel.'53
In respect to whether it meets the President's goals for the Patent
System,154 the author would state that it certainly would delay the granting
of a patent from the date of application to the date of issue because there
would be more opportunity for delay by third parties submitting prior art
consisting of printed publications and patents. I believe that patent
examiners right now do a good job of discovering the pertinent prior art,
especially the relevant prior art dealing with patents and publications.
Accordingly, this change or expansion of the third party prior art
opportunity would not meet the goal of shortening the time from patent
application to patent issuance."'5 Although the submission of relevant
patents and publications might sometimes help the examiners in their
search for relevant prior art, and thereby make the subsequent issuing
patent stronger, and possibly strengthen the issued patent, I believe these
positive expectations do not outweigh the procrastination and unnecessary
delay caused by the additional time incurred to scrutinize these extra
patents and publications submitted by third parties. Therefore, I conclude
that this provision does56not meet the goals of the President's Commission
on the Patent System.1
M. New Opposition ProceedingChange
1. Present Law
While U.S. patent law does not have a section labeled "Opposition
Proceedings," it does have a section that achieves, to a smaller extent, the

Reexamination, Opposition, or Litigation? Legislative Efforts to Create a Post-Grant Patent
Quality ControlSystem, 31 AIPLA Q.J. 433, 472 (2003) (stating the newly amended interpartes
reexamination proposal does not resolve all the problems; we may need a USPTO proceeding,
which is likened to the USITC section 337 trials, that "marries inter partes reexamination to inter
partes opposition procedures").
153. See, e.g., Susan Perng Pan, Considerationsfor Modifying Inter-partesReexam and
Implementing Other Post-GrantReview, 45 IDEA 1, 3 (2004) (discussing reexamination as an
attempt to provide an alternative to existing law and to encourage litigants to use the USPTO to
resolve patentability issues without expanding the process into the courtroom).
154. See S. Doc. No. 90-5 (1967).
155. See id.
156. See id.
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same type of action-that is, reexamination of patents. The reexamination
of patents is covered by sections 301-307 of the Patent Statute, 157and its
initial section, section 301, is entitled "Citation of the Prior Art."'
2. Present Section 311 of the Code
Section 311 of the present law, entitled "Request for Inter Partes
Reexamination," states, "[a]ny third-party requester at any time may file
a request for inter partes reexamination by the Office of a patent on the
basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of section 301."58 This is
a reexamination of the patent after the patent is issued. ' Thus, it is a postissuance reexamination, which would be very similar to a foreign fullblown post-issuance opposition proceeding." 6 Under section 311; the
request shall:
(1) be in writing, include the identity of the real party in interest,
and be accompanied by payment of an inter partes
reexamination fee established by the Director under section 41;
and
(2) set forth the pertinency and manner of applying cited prior art to
"'
every claim for which reexamination is requested.16
Section 311 (c) states that unless the requesting person is the owner of the
patent, the62 Director shall promptly send a copy of the request to the
patentee. 1
Under the U.S. Patent System, we do not currently have, per se,
opposition proceedings as they do in Europe.'63 Rather, the U.S. Patent
System has incorporated reexamination into interpartesproceedings since
1980."64 Commentators have viewed this reexamination proceeding as a

157. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2002-06).
158. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2002).
159. For a good overview of interpartes reexamination procedures, see generally Kenneth L.
Cage & Lawrence T. Cullen, An Overview of Inter PartesReexamination Procedures,85 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 931 (2003) (providing an analysis of inter partes reexamination
procedures implemented by the Optional Inter partes Reexamination Procedures Act of 1999).
160. See, e.g., Frederick C. Williams, GivingInterPartesPatentReexamination a Chance To
Work, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 265,294-95 (2004) (stating that opposition in Europe is so broad that almost
any ground on which a patent application can be rejected is a basis for an opposition).
161. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2002).
162. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(c) (2002).
163. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2002).
164. See 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2002).
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more limited form of an opposition proceeding.'65 Under this
reexamination statute, any individual, including the patentee, a competitor,
or the Director of the USPTO, can cite the prior art patent or printed
publication to the patent examiner, and the USPTO must determine
whether this reference raises a "substantial new question of patentability"
with respect to the patent that was issued." 6
Following the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999,167 an inter
partes reexamination allows the requester to participate more fully in the
proceedings through the submission of arguments and the submission of
appeals. As a result of this reexamination, the USPTO may issue a
certificate confirming the patentability of the original patent, or an
amended patent with more narrow claims, or a declaration of invalidity. 6 '
The USPTO is authorized by section 316 of the Patent Act, "Certificate of
patentability, unpatentability, and claim cancellation," to issue summaries
inter partes reexamination
of the final conclusion to the post-grant,
169
currently allowed in the patent code.
I believe Congress intended for reexamination proceedings to serve as
an inexpensive alternative to patent litigation determination of patent
validity. Reexamination also allows further access to the legal and
technical expertise of the USPTO after a patent has issued. However, some
believe that the reexamination proceedings have been employed too
sparingly and question their effectiveness.' 70
Some patent analysts have expressed the viewpoint that potential
requesters are discouraged from commencing interpartesreexamination
proceedings due to a statute that limits their future options. Their argument
can be summarized as follows: in order to try to discourage abuse of these
proceedings, the interpartesreexamination statute provides that the third
party may not later assert that a patent is invalid "on any ground which
[they] raised or could have raised during the inter partes reexamination

165. See Thomas, supranote 143, at 377 (articulating that statistics indicate that reexamination
is more widely employed outside the United States, and foreign reexaminations more often result
in findings of patent invalidity than domestic reexaminations). Additionally, foreign opposition
proceedings are more accessible than the only inter partes proceeding offered by the USPTO
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 135, the interference section. Sherry M. Knowles et al., Opposition
ProceedingsAre Alternative to Court,NAT'L L.J., Oct. 19, 1998, at C45.
166. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (2002).
167. See id.
168. 35 U.S.C. § 316 (2002).
169. See id,
170. See ROGER E.SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW § 7.5.4 (1st
ed. 2004).
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proceedings.""'7 Some believe that this potential estoppel effect disinclines
potential requesters from using this post-issuance proceeding.'72
Because of this concern, H.R. 2795 would delete the phrase "or could
have raised" from the statute.173 As a consequence, inter partes
reexamination requesters would be limited only by the arguments that they
had actually made, before the USPTO, and not arguments that could have
been made.
III. PROBLEMS STILL REMAINING NOT ADDRESSED BY H.R. 2795

A. Doctrine of Inherency Still a Problem UnderPresent Law
74
An invention must be novel at the time of discovery to be patentable. 1
A patent fails the section 102 novelty requirement when the invention is
anticipated by prior art by the doctrine of inherency. An example of
invalidity by section 102 anticipation is a single prior art reference that
' 75
discloses "each and every limitation of the claimed invention."'
Accordingly, under the doctrine of inherency, a patent is invalid based on
anticipation even if a prior art reference completely disclosed a feature of
the claimed invention, as long as the missing feature is a "deliberate or a
necessary consequence of what was intended,"
even if it was unknown to
76
the inventor at the time of the invention.
However, the doctrine of inherency does require certainty; for instance,
an accidental achievement of a product or process does not constitute
inherent anticipation since a true accident gives the public
no assurance
77
that others can achieve the same result at a later time.
In Schering, the Federal Circuit faced a long-standing conundrum
dealing with the doctrine of inherent anticipation-that is, whether actual
recognition of an inherent feature in the prior art is required. 78 The court
invalidated an allergy medicine patent claim on the ground that a prior
drug patent "inherently anticipated" all of the drug's metabolites, that is,

171.
172.
Working
173.
174.
175.

35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2002).
See, e.g., Jonathan Levin & Richard Levin, PatentOppositions3-5 (Stanford Law School,
Paper No. 245, 2002; Yale Law School, Discussion Paper No. 283, 2002.
Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 9(d) (2005).
See35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002).
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

176. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.03 (2004).

177. Id.
178. See Schering, 339 F.3d at 1377.
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the compounds formed by the human body upon ingestion of the particular
drug. The Federal Circuit held that the doctrine of inherent anticipation
does not require that the feature be appreciated or recognized at the time
of the earlier patent, but inherent anticipation is found as long as the
disclosure is a "necessary and inevitable consequence of the earlier
' For instance, in Abbott Labs v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., the
invention."179
Federal Circuit held that the small unintended production of the IV form
of trazosin hydrochloride anhydrate, a chemical compound which was
unknown at the time of the main invention, was a statutory bar via section
102(b) for a patentee who later discovered trazosin hydrochloride
anhydrate. 180 Therefore, a patent application fails to meet the novelty
requirement if the same invention is anticipated by a single prior art, that
is, if a single prior art reference discloses "each and every element of the
claimed invention." 181
The fine line walked by the Federal Circuit in determining the ambit of
doctrine of inherency is illustrated by the Supreme Court decision in
Tilghman v. Proctor,which held, on the other hand, that if the very assets
in question were accidentally and unwittingly produced, or if the operators
were in pursuit of other and different results, without incurring their
attention and without knowing what was done or how it was done, "it
would be absurd to say that this was an anticipation under the doctrine of
inherency.' 82
In an analogous case, in Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. PaperCo.,
the Supreme Court held that "accidental results not intended and not
appreciated, do not constitute anticipation. 1 83 In this particular case, Eibel
claimed an improved papermaking machine by elevating the pitch of the
papermaking wire by several degrees. 8 4 The alleged infringer, seeking to
invalidate the patent under the doctrine of inherency, introduced some
prior art machines that changed their pitch several degrees for drainage
purposes. 85 The Court, in denying anticipation under the doctrine of
inherency, held that unappreciated accidental results should not prevent an
inventor from claiming a conscious and deliberate discovery he had made.
Following the Tilghman and Eibel Processdecisions, the Third Circuit
held in PittsburghIron & Steel Foundries v. Seaman-Sleeth Co. that a

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See id.at 1378-80.
Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711-12 (1880).
Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 66 (1923).
See id. at 52, 58.
Id. at 52, 58.
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prior accidental production of an alloy was "not known to those who
produced it" and not "recognized as a new product." Therefore, the new
alloy was "without value as an anticipation" under the doctrine of
inherency.'86 In a similar case, Munising Paper Co. v. American Sulphite
Pulp Co., the Sixth Circuit held that the "prior accidental production of the
same thing, when the character and function were not recognized until the
invention of the later patent, does not effect anticipation," under the
doctrine of inherency.187 Also in Toch v. Zibell Damp Resisting PaintCo.,
the Second Circuit held that novelty was not defeated by anticipation
under the doctrine of inherency if the prior user had no knowledge of the
results. 88
Therefore, even if not known before the patenting of an invention, a
later-discovered inherent scientific fact can invalidate a patent on a
subsequent related invention. 89 It is interesting to note that the Federal
Circuit has relied upon post-issuance evidence to establish inherency. For
example, in Eli Lilly Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., the Court relied upon
evidence generated years after the issuance of a patent to establish
inherency to support invalidating a patent on the grounds of double
patenting.' 9°
B. Secret PriorArt is Still a Problem
Secret prior art is another serious problem that has arisen under section
102 of the present law, that even the Federal Circuit has not solved, and
has been divided in its opinion as to how to solve its inherent problem.
Unfortunately, H.R. 2795 also does not address nor resolve this problem.
The problems created by secret prior art were eloquently described by
Professor Harold Wegner of the George Washington School of Law when
he wrote:
"Secret" prior art is a contradiction in terms. Prior 'art' should refer
to the known (or at least knowable) state of art at the time the

186. Pittsburgh Iron & Steel Foundries Co. v. Seaman-Sleeth Co., 248 F. 705, 709 (3d Cir.
1917).
187. Munising Paper Co. v. Am. Sulphite Pulp Co., 228 F. 700, 703 (6th Cir. 1915).
188. See Toch v. Zibell Damp Resisting Paint Co., 233 F. 993, 995 (2d Cir. 1916) ("novelty
is not negatived by a prior art accidental production of the same thing when the operator does not
recognize the means by which the accidental result is accomplished and no knowledge of them, or
of the method of their employment, is derived from the prior art by any one").
189. See, e.g., In re Shetty, 566 F.2d 81,86-87 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (stating "what may be inherent
is not necessarily known"); In re Kratz, 592 F.2d 1169, 1174-75 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
190. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 968-72 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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invention is made: at the time the invention was made, was the sum
total of knowledge from prior use, printed publications and patents
then available such that the claimed invention would have been at
that time [novel or] obvious to the worker with ordinary skill in the
art? 191
Substituting the first to file for the first to invent procedure, eliminates this
contentious problem that has arisen in many cases, and in many cases have
caused insurmountable problems for the patentee inventor, and has
resulted in an unreasonable and unwanted result, that is, a result that stifles
the progress of the useful arts instead of advancing it. Under the present
law, secret prior art is usually subsumed in section 102(a) that a patentee
cannot obtain a patent for an invention if it is known, or used by others in
this country, or patented, or described in a publication in this or a foreign
country, that is, anywhere in the world, before the invention.
The thorny sub-issue involved in any question of secret prior art is the
"known or used" by others in this country, that is, in the United States, and
to what extent this invention has to be known or used by persons in this
country. Under a reasonable interpretation of this section of the Patent Act,
it would be fair to say that if an invention was known or used by others in
this country, it should also have been available to others in this country,
that is, at least the majority of the public in this country, and therefore,
ipso facto, accessible to the general public.
On the contrary, if an invention is secretively used, and kept from the
public, it would appear to be not known or used by the public, and
therefore would not be "known or used by others in this country."' 9 2
If a scientific building: (1) is not accessible to the public without
wearing a National Institutes of Health (NIH) identification badge, and (2)
a certain invention is secretly used on the seventh floor of that building,
and (3) this NIH building is far outside of Washington, D.C., in fact so far
out of Washington that it is in Bethesda, Maryland, one would think that
because this building was inaccessible to the general public and the
invention was on the seventh floor, the invention could not be deemed
publicly accessible in that faraway and restricted building.
However, the Federal Circuit held that the building in Bethesda that
was restricted to NIH personnel with NIH badges, and where the invention
was located on the seventh floor, where the public was not invited or told
where it was, could be held to be "publicly accessible."' 93 In Baxter, the
191. Wegner, supra note 120, at 244.
192. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2002).
193. See Baxter Intern., Inc. v. COBE Labs., Inc., 88 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (Fed Cir. 1996).
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Federal Circuit held just this unexpected result-that is that the invention
therein was publicly accessible under section 102 (a). In a brilliant
dissenting opinion, Judge Pauline Newman explained:
This new rule of law, that unpublished laboratory use after a
reduction to practice is a public use, creates a new and mischievous
category of "secret" prior art. Irespectfully dissent from the court's
ruling, for it is contrary to, and misapplies, the law of 35 U.S.C. §
102.

[T]he patent statute and precedent do not elevate private laboratory
use after a reduction to practice to "public use" under § 102(b).
When the public use is unknown and unknowable information in
the possession of third persons, 35 U.S.C. § 102 accommodates
such "secret prior art" only in the limited circumstances of § 102(e).

This new category of internal laboratory use is immune to the most
painstaking documentary search. The court thus produces a
perpetual cloud on any issued patent, defeating the objective
standards and policy considerations embodied in the § 102
definitions of prior art.

It is incorrect to interpret 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) to mean that
laboratory use after a reduction to practice is a "public use," and
thus a bar against any patent application filed, by anyone, more than
a year thereafter. Section 102(b) was not intended to add to the bars
based on information not published or publicly known or otherwise
within the definition of prior art.94
The problem with the Federal Circuit's interpretation of sections 102(a)
and 102(b) is that it can lead to ridiculous, unfair and inequitable results,
such as in the case of Lorenz v. Colgate-Palmolive-PeetCo.195 Here, the
Third Circuit used reasoning-similar to what the Federal Circuit used
194. See id.at 1061-63.
195. 167 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1948).
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later in Baxter-andheld that when an unscrupulous individual steals an
inventor's ideas and makes a commercial use prior to the critical date (date
of invention or filing date), that such activity constitutes a "public use"
under section 102(b). The equitable answer would be that a thief should
not be able to steal an inventor's idea and disclose it and thus make it a
"public use" and bar under section 102(b). However, the Third Circuit in
Lorenz apparently said yes:
The prior-public-use proviso of R.S. Sec. 4886 was enacted by
Congress in the public interest. It contains no qualification or
exception which limits the nature of the public use. We think that
Congress intended that if an inventor does not protect his discovery
by an application for a patent within the period prescribed by the
Act, and an intervening public use arises from any source
whatsoever, the inventor must be barred from a patent or from the
fruits of his monopoly, if a patent has issued to him. There is not a
single word in the statute which would tend to put an inventor,
whose disclosures have been pirated, in any different position from
one who has permitted the use of his process.' 9 6
Thus, as you can see, I do not believe the Federal Circuit's opinion in
Baxter was a wise one, and specifically agree wholeheartedly with the
dissent of Circuit Judge Pauline Newman. She eloquently described the
problems with the ruling and its rationality. The holding in Lorenz 19 7
demonstrates how this line of reasoning can lead to such absurd results.
Accordingly, since the FTF rule will eliminate the problem of "secret
prior art," I would be in favor of the FTF rule, particularly since it will
achieve the six goals of the President's Commission on the Patent System.
There are numerous other cases that demonstrate the contentiousness
of "secret prior art" and the problems that it has caused. I have named
some cases below which discuss "secret prior art."9' As one can see by the

196. Id. at 429.
197. Id.at 430.
198. See, e.g., Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965); Alexander Milburn
Co. v. Davis-Boumonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926); E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 37
(1918); Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Huston,
308 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Celeritas Techs. v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1998); OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 78 F.3d 540 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re
Bartfeld, 925 F.2d 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Sun Studs,
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numerous cases discussing the contentions on dealing with secret prior art,
the problems arising from this issue have been with us for nine decades,
reaching as far back as the 1918 E.W Bliss Co. v. United States case.' 99
IV. RECOMMENDED PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE LEGISLATION

The American Intellectual and Patent Law Association (AIPLA) has
recommended new changes to the opposition proceeding. 00 The AIPLA
recommends the expansion of the present-day opposition proceeding
request to allow the challenge of validity based upon double patenting and
any of the requirements for patentability set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102
(except issues arising under subsections (c), (f), and (g)), 103 and 112 (
1 and 2 (except for best mode)), or 251 (paragraph 4). They also
recommend allowing the patentee to add claims by amendment; they
recommend the cross-examination of witnesses, but no other discovery
except for what is required in the interests ofjustice; and they recommend
a burden of proof of a preponderance of evidence and providing the
broadest reasonable construction of a claim. They recommend that a party
should be allowed to appeal to the Federal Circuit. They also recommend
preclusive effect on a requester in any subsequent proceeding of invalidity
raised by that requester and decided by that panel that is necessary to the
final determination of the case. In addition, they recommend concluding
such an opposition proceeding not later than one year after the institution,
with a possible extension of not more than six months. Finally, they
recommend that the parties be allowed to terminate the proceeding by a
joint request of the requester and the patent owner pursuant to a settlement
agreement. The AIPLA hopes that such a process would provide
significant opportunities for enhancing patent quality; thereby increasing
business certainty, promoting competition, and fostering continued
innovation.
A. PresentH.R. 2795
The present bill, H.R. 2795, creates a brand-new chapter, entitled
"Chapter 32-Post Grant Opposition Procedures," consisting of twenty
new sections, entitled: "Right To Oppose Patent And Opposition Request";
Inc. v. ATA Equip. Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978,980 (Fed. Cir. 1989), overruledon othergrounds
by A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
199. E. W. Bliss, 248 U.S. at 37.
200. See AIPLA Response to the National Academy's report entitled "A Patent System for the
21st Century," at 14-20.
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"Real Party In Interest"; "Timing Of Opposition Request"; "Limits On
Scope Of Validity Issues Raised"; "Institution Of The Opposition
Proceeding; Stay Upon Timely Filed Suit"; "Patent Owner Response";
"Amendment Of Claims"; "Discovery And Sanctions"; "Supplemental
Submissions"; "Hearing And Briefs"; "Written Decision"; "Burden Of
Proof And Evidence"; "Reconsideration"; "Appeal"; "Certificate";
"Estoppel"; "Duration Of Opposition"; "Settlement"; "Intervening
Rights"; and finally, "Relationship With Reexamination Proceedings."
Some experts have expressed the opinion that potential requesters are
discouraged from using the present-day inter partes reexamination
proceedings due to a provision that limits their future options.2"' In order
to discourage the abuse of these proceedings, the present day interpartes
reexamination statute provides that third-party interveners may not later
assert that a patent is invalid on any ground that they raised or could have
raised during the interpartesproceeding. °2 Some experts believe that this
potential estoppel effect disinclines potential requesters from using this
particular post-issuance proceeding. In an apparent response to this
concern, H.R. 2795 would delete the phrase "or could have raised" from
the statute. As a result, inter partes reexamination requesters would be
limited only to arguments that they actually made, and not could have
made, before the USPTO. The pertinent estoppel language is found in
Section 336 of the bill:
[T]he determination with respect to an issue of invalidity raised by
an opposer shall bar the opposer from asserting, in any subsequent
proceeding before the Office or a court involving that opposer
under this title, that any claim of that patent addressed in the
opposition proceeding is invalid on the basis of any issue of fact or
law actually decided by the panel and necessary to the
determination of that issue.20 3
However, H.R. 2795 also creates an exception to this rule, which may
open up a Pandora's box of litigation in this language:
If an opposer in an opposition proceeding demonstrates in a
subsequent proceeding referred to in paragraph (1) that there is

201. See 35 U.S.C. § 317 (2006).
202. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), § 337 (Duration of
Opposition).
203. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 336(a)(1) (2005).
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additional factual evidence that is material to an issue of fact
actually decided and necessary to the final determination in the
opposition proceeding, that could not reasonably have been
discovered by that opposer, the opposer may raise, in that
subsequent proceeding, that issue of fact and any determined issue
of law for which the issue of fact was necessary.20"
This expanded exception to the general rule of estoppel on the opposer,
indeed will create a quagmire in many trial courts to pin down the
applicability of exceptions to the general estoppel doctrine.
Section 337 controls the duration of the opposition and in general,
states that most of these opposition proceedings should be concluded
within one year after commencement." 5 However, there is an exception.
H.R. 2795 grants an extension of six months to an opposer showing good
cause.2" 6 Therefore, the question of invalidity of the patent may be under
litigation for an additional eighteen months after the patent has been
issued.20 7 This puts a monumental strain on the finances of the small
inventor as opposed to the inventors who are working for large
corporations or universities to continue to fight for the survival of their
patent.
One is concerned with the financial impact to small inventors on their
ability to withstand the financial attack on their patents for an additional
eighteen months after having already spent thousands of dollars paying
their attorneys simply to get the patent issued. It is a well-known fact that
an inventor may have to pay his agent or attorney thousands of dollars just
to demonstrate that his invention is protected by a patent and finally
issued. However, the inventors may not be able to afford, nor want to
involve their money, to defend an opposition proceeding for eighteen
months, and incur further patent attorney fees-at an average of $500 an
hou r ° -making the defense of an opposition proceeding almost
prohibitive.
B. Is H.R. 2795 Too Broad When It Addresses OppositionProceedings?
All the recommendations by H.R. 2795 in its "Chapter 32-Post-Grant
Opposition Procedures" are already available to an opposer in a court of
204. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 336(a)(2) (2005).
205. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 337 (2005).
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. This Judge has personal knowledge that the large prominent law firms in Washington,
D.C., now charge about $500 an hour for their senior law partner's patent work.
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law where that opposer is attempting to adjudicate a patent's validity after
that opposer has been charged with alleged infringement against the
inventor's issued patent. In other words, all these rights already exist to an
infringer, once an infringer chooses to go to court and challenge the patent
rather than pay a reasonable royalty for the use of that patent.20 9 Here, H.R.
2795 gives that potential infringer the right to challenge that patent before
it ever goes to a federal court in an opposition proceeding. Thus, the fullblown opposition proceeding found in chapter 32 of H.R. 2795 gives the
infringer two bites of the apple.2"' One bite occurs during the full-blown
opposition proceeding under H.R. 2795,2 ' and the second bite becomes
available in the trial court where a judge is faced with the question of the
validity of the patent.212 Keeping in mind that we must protect the small
inventors as well as the large inventors, such as inventors for big
corporations and large universities, we must keep in mind whether it is
wise to allow a double attack on the inventor because it is the American
inventor who is given the responsibility to stimulate the progress of
science and the useful arts.2 13
C. The President'sCommission on the PatentSystem
It would appear that the totality of the effect of chapter 32 of H.R. 2795
is too chilling on the American inventor, particularly the small inventor,
to allow this judge to recommend H.R. 2795."4 In view of the fact that all
the elements of the full-blown opposition proceeding are ultimately
available to the infringer in a court of law,215 there is too much at stake
when we consider the loss of motivation and threat of financial catastrophe
to the small inventor to allow full-blown opposition proceedings.2"6 H.R.
2795, Chapter 32, definitely will not achieve the second goal of the
President's Commission on the Patent System of"shorten[ing] the period
ofpendency of a patent application from filing to final disposition by [the]
Patent Office, '2 17 because final disposition will not end at the issuance of

209. See generally 35 U.S.C.

§ 271

(Infringement of Patent).

210. Patent Reform Act of2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. §§ 321-340 (Post-Grant Opposition
Procedures).
211. Id.
212. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-105 (Patentability ofInventions); 35 U.S.C. §§ 281-282
(Remedy for Infringement of Patent; Presumption of Validity; Defenses).
213. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
214. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong.
215. See supra note 212.
216. See id.§§ 321-340.
217. See S.Doc. No. 90-5 (1967).
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the patent, but will be elongated eighteen months until the termination of
the opposition proceeding."' It will also fail to achieve the fourth goal of
the President's Commission, that is, "[t]o reduce the expenses of obtaining
and litigating a patent." In fact, it may double or triple the expenses of
litigation for the inventor and .not even allow the inventor to afford to get
to a court of law. While H.R. 2795 may help to raise the quality and
reliability of U.S. patents and may make U.S. Patent practice more
compatible with that of other major countries, I do not believe those
meritorious achievements overcome the financial disaster and disincentive
upon America's small inventors that will chill their ability to survive the
financial challenges created by the full-blown opposition proceedings in
Chapter 32 of H.R. 2795.219 When one considers that we are not losing
anything by not adopting Chapter 32 that is not available in a court of law,
I believe Chapter 32 of H.R. 2795 creates more problems and is a
Pandora's box that is best left unopened.
V. CONCLUSION

In my opinion the two best features of this pending patent bill are the
proposed changes to the FTF, from the old FTI system and the proposed
elimination of the "best mode" requirement-for the reasons set forth in
this Article-particularly as expressed in the article by Professor Harold
Wegner 2 1 of the George Washington University. As discussed, all the
other changes proposed only give a limited gain with substantial downside.
All the recommendations by H.R. 2795 in its "Chapter 32-Post-Grant
Opposition Procedures" are already available to an opposer in a court of
law where that opposer is attempting to adjudicate a patent's validity after
that opposer has been charged with alleged infringement against the
inventor's issued patent. In other words, all these rights already exist to an
infringer once an infringer chooses to go to court and challenge the patent
rather than pay a reasonable royalty for the use of that patent. Here, H.R.
2795 gives that potential infringer the right to challenge that patent before
it ever goes to a federal court in an opposition proceeding. Thus, the fullblown opposition proceeding found in Chapter 32 of H.R. 2795 gives the
218. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong., § 337.
219. Jonathan Levin & Richard Levin, Patent Oppositions, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOSEPH
STIGLITZ 221 (R. Amott et.al. eds., 2003) (Stiglitz is a former President of Massachusetts Institute
of Technology).
220. Wegner, supra note 120, at 244. He was a co-author with Judge Randall R. Rader of the
U.S. Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit, of a Patent Law casebook, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON PATENT LAW (3d ed. 2005).
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infringer two bites of the apple. One bite occurs during the full-blown
opposition proceeding under H.R. 2795, and the second bite becomes
available in the trial court where a judge is faced with the question of the
validity of the patent. Keeping in mind that we must protect the small
inventors as well as the large inventors-such as inventors for big
corporations and large universities-we must keep in mind whether it is
wise to allow a double attack on the inventor because it is the American
inventor that is given the responsibility to stimulate the progress of the
science and the useful arts, and without him making this progress there can
be no progress of the useful arts in our country.
It would appear, that the totality of the effect of Chapter 32 of H.R.
2795 is too chilling on the American inventor, particularly the small
inventor, to allow me to recommend H.R. 2795. There is too much at stake
when we consider the loss of motivation and threat of financial catastrophe
to the small inventor to allow full-blown opposition proceedings. In view
of the fact that, all the elements of the full-blown opposition proceeding
are ultimately available to the infringer in a court of law. H.R. 2795,
Chapter 32 definitely will not achieve the second goal of the President's
Commission on the Patent System of "shortening the period of application
from filing to final disposition in the patent office" because final
disposition will not end at the issuance of the patent, but will be elongated
eighteen months until the termination of the opposition proceeding. It will
also fail to achieve the fourth goal of the President's Commission, that is,
"to reduce the expenses of litigation." In fact, it may double or triple the
expenses of litigation of the inventor and not even allow the inventor to
afford to get to a court of law. While H.R. 2795 may help to raise the
quality and reliability of U.S. patents and may make U.S. Patent practice
more compatible with that of other major countries, I do not believe those
meritorious achievements overcome the financial disaster and disincentive
upon America's small inventors that will chill their ability to survive the
financial challenges created by the full-blown opposition proceedings in
Chapter 32 of H.R. 2795. 1 believe Chapter 32 of H.R. 2795 creates its
own Pandora's Box of unique problems that can be eliminated by not
adopting it.

